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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tyler Shawn Clapp appeals from the summary denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Clapp filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging the revocation of
his probation and execution of his sentence for felony DUI. (R., pp. 4-17.) The
district court summarily dismissed the petition. (R., pp. 158-75.) Clapp filed a
motion for relief from the judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b). (R., pp. 186-90.) The
court granted the motion and set aside the judgment and allowed Clapp to file an
amended petition. (R., pp. 196-98.) Clapp filed an amended petition. (R., pp.
177-83.) Included in the amended petition, relevant to this appeal, were claims
that trial counsel "did not provide effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment" by not obtaining "mental health treatment records from
Nampa Medical, and an updated mental health evaluation" (R., pp. 178-79) and
that appellate counsel rendered deficient performance by not "challeng[ing]
evidence" that petitioner was "driving a lot," which "Petitioner deemed unreliable"
(R., p. 182).
The State answered and moved for summary disposition. (R., pp. 219-21,
224-35.) Clapp responded to the motion. (R., pp. 268-72.) The district court
granted the motion and dismissed the petition. (R., pp. 274-88.) Clapp timely
appealed. (R., p. 290.)
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ISSUES

Clapp states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err in dismissing the portion of Mr.
Clapp's first cause of action, i.e., that counsel was ineffective
for not providing mental health records to the court, on a
basis which was not raised in the state's motion for summary
disposition without giving Mr. Clapp twenty-days notice of its
intent to dismiss on that basis?

2.

Did the district court also err by dismissing Mr. Clapp's fifth
cause of action on an alternative basis which was not raised
in the state's motion for summary disposition without giving
Mr. Clapp twenty-days notice of its intent to dismiss on that
basis?

3.

Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Clapp's fifth cause
of action because the allegation that Mr. Clapp had been
driving was not supported by sufficiently reliable evidence
and thus should have been challenged on appeal?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Clapp failed to show that he was not put on notice that his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present medical records at
the probation disposition hearing was subject to dismissal because it was
unsupported by evidence and disproven by the record?

2.

Has Clapp failed to show error in the dismissal of his claim that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the district court violated his
due process rights by considering hearsay information indicating he had
driven without a license during probation?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Clapp Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Not Submitting His Medical Records At
The Disposition Hearing
A.

Introduction
Clapp asserts that the district court granted dismissal on grounds other

than articulated in the motion for summary disposition, thus depriving him of his
statutory notice. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-10.) Application of the relevant law to
the record shows that the district court did not grant summary disposition on a
ground unrequested by the state.

Moreover, because dismissal was proper

under the theories articulated by the state this Court may affirm on those theories
on free review.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted.
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. ~ at 434, 835 P.2d
at 669. The court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions
of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001).
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C.

The District Court Granted Summary Disposition On The Same Grounds
As Raised By The State's Motion
Where a summary dismissal is based in whole or in part on grounds

asserted by the state in its motion, a post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to
claim that he lacked notice for the first time on appeal. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho
517, 523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010). He may, however, make such a claim if
the grounds for dismissal are other than those offered by the state in support of
its motion. !sl; Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct.
App. 1986) ("When the court dismisses a case upon the state's motion for
dismissal, it must still provide twenty-days notice [as required by I.C. § 194906(b)] if the dismissal is based on grounds different from those presented in
the motion for dismissal."). See also Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164
P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d
795, 798 (1995).

Grounds for dismissal in a motion and in an order are different

only if they are "different in kind," meaning they lack "substantial" overlap. Buss
v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517-18, 211 P.3d 123, 126-27 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing
Workman, 144 Idaho at 524, 164 P.3d at 804). Review of the record shows that
the dismissal by the district court was not on different grounds than requested by
the state.
The state moved to dismiss because the "ineffective assistance of counsel
claims fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice." (R., p. 224.) In its brief in support of the
motion the state asserted Clapp's "post-conviction allegations are bare and
conclusory, are unsupported by admissible evidence, and fail to raise a genuine
4

issue of material fact." (R., p. 230.) Furthermore, the State argued the specific
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present medical
records was "disproven by the trial record," which the State supplied in support of
its motion. (R., pp. 230, 237-67.)
Clapp contended that the state's argument was "not correct" because
medical records had been supplied to the court. (R., pp. 268-69. 1 ) He claimed
that the evidence he submitted demonstrated that the information before the
court in the probation violation disposition hearing "was outdated, erroneous, and
did not contain accurate information as to whether or not the petitioner could be
managed with medication." (R., p. 269.)
The district court concluded there was no material issue of fact, and the
State was entitled to summary dismissal of this claim. (R., pp. 274-86.) As part
of this analysis the court specifically reviewed the record of the probation
proceedings as submitted by and relied on by the state. (R., p. 279.) The district
court concluded that the record disproved Clapp's allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel. (R., pp. 279-80.)
The record demonstrates that the state requested dismissal for lack of
sufficient supporting evidence and because the claim was disproven by the
underlying record.

The district court granted the motion, dismissing the claim

because it was disproved by the underlying record. Any differences in the district
court's articulation of why the underlying criminal record disproved the claim did

The record contains no medical records supplied with the amended petition or
the response to the motion for summary dismissal. Counsel is apparently
referring to records supplied with the original petition. (R., pp. 38-43.)
1
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not make the grounds for dismissal "different in kind" and did not deprive Clapp
of notice that whether the record disproved his claim was at issue. A remand in
this case would accomplish nothing because there is no reason to believe that
Clapp withheld evidence believing he did not need to submit it in response to the
State's motion.

Clapp is not entitled to reversal on the theory that he did not

have adequate opportunity to respond to the state's motion.

D.

The Evidence Clapp Submitted Does Not Support A Prima Facie Claim
Even if the grounds for the district court's order of summarily dismissal

were entirely different from those claimed in the State's motion, the order of
summary dismissal may still be affirmed on the grounds asserted in the State's
motion if no material issue of fact on those grounds is contained in the record.
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010); Baxter v. State,
149 Idaho 859, 243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010). Application of the correct legal
standards to the evidence presented by Clapp shows that the State's motion for
summary dismissal was well taken because the evidence does not support
Clapp's claim.
The "right to be represented by appointed counsel" at probation revocation
hearings is "a due process right." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 (1973).
Because the right is not "the right of an accused to counsel in a criminal
prosecution" but instead "the more limited due process right of one who is a
probationer or parolee only because he has been convicted of a crime," the
decision of whether counsel should be appointed is "made on a case-by-case
basis in the exercise of sound discretion." Id. at 789-90. A probationer accused
6

of a probation violation is entitled to appointed counsel only if he makes "a timely
and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the
conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter
of public record or uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or
mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons
are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present."

kt at 790. 2

Clapp made no prima facie showing that the medical records "justified or
mitigated the violation" to the point that revocation was "inappropriate." Even if
he had a due process right to counsel the evidence does not raise a viable claim
that his counsel was ineffective for not presenting medical records to the court at
the disposition hearing. 3 The records in question show a single office visit on
May 6, 2011 to "est[ablish] care" for "depression." (R., p. 38.) As a result of the
office visit Clapp was prescribed Fluoxetine for his depression. (R., p. 42.) The
probation violations arising from drinking in violation of the conditions of
probation occurred over the course of several days about three months after the

This Court, citing Gagnon, has stated that this right to counsel on a case-bycase basis is a Sixth Amendment right. State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 282, 833
P.2d 911, 915 (1992). This statement is dicta because the issue in Young was
decided on statutory grounds. The statement is also wrong, because Gagnon
was clearly decided on due process grounds, and not the Sixth Amendment.
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 789-90.
2

Because the right to counsel arises out of due process and not the Sixth
Amendment, there is no reason to believe the Sixth Amendment guarantees of
effective assistance of counsel apply in this case. Thus, even if due process
required appointment of counsel, Clapp has cited no legal authority for the
proposition that such counsel must meet standards of effectiveness. To meet the
Sixth Amendment standards of ineffective assistance of counsel Clapp would
have to prove deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
3
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office visit. (R., p. 255.) The medical records ultimately undercut Clapp's claims
at the disposition hearing that the Fluoxetine prescription had "mostly solved my
self-medicating with alcohol" (R., p. 265 (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 13-18)) by showing that
Clapp was drinking heavily (and violating his probation) after being given the
prescription.

The evidence presented by Clapp simply does not rise to the level

of showing a due process right to counsel, much less that any constitutional right
was infringed by counsel's conduct. The district court may be affirmed on this
basis to the extent it is different from the actual grounds articulated by the district
court below.

11.
Clapp Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel
One of the probation violations alleged in the criminal proceedings was
that Clapp had violated the law. (R., p. 254.) This allegation was based on the
probation officer's report that Clapp had admitted driving his father's truck "a lot"
without a valid license.

(Id.) At the probation violation disposition hearing the

district court expressed concern that Clapp had been driving in the same general
timeframe he was also drinking. (R., p. 265 (Tr., p. 15, L. 21 - p. 16, L. 6).)
In this post-conviction case Clapp asserted a claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel for failing to claim that the district court's reliance
on the probation officer's report at the probation disposition hearing violated due
process. (R., p. 205.) The state moved for summary dismissal on the basis that
"the petition fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact" "in light of the
pleadings, answers, admissions and the record of the underlying criminal case."
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(R., p. 224.) The State argued the claims were "controverted [sic] by the record"
and "fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact." (R., p. 230.) In regard to the
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the State argued that this
claim was "bare and conclusory without any demonstration of prejudice," not
supported by any evidence, and contrary to law, and therefore "fails to raise a
genuine issue of material fact regarding either deficient performance or resulting
prejudice." (R., pp. 233-34.)
Clapp responded to the State's argument as follows:
With regard to his appellate counsel, petitioner told his
appellate counsel he wanted to challenge his conviction and
sentence on due process grounds, but was advised by counsel that
he [counsel] did not know too much about the "due process"
grounds for relief. Nothing was done.
(R., p. 271.)
The district court granted the state's motion, concluding there was no
evidence of prejudice because the State had preserved the right to argue the
dismissed probation violation allegations in disposition and the statement of the
probation officer that Clapp admitted driving was credible and substantial
evidence.

(R., pp. 284-85.)

The district court additionally concluded that the

same disposition (execution of the sentence) was appropriate even without the
finding of driving. (R., p. 285.) Finally, the district court concluded that the due
process issue was "nonviable" on appeal, and therefore there was no deficient
performance. (Id.)
On appeal Clapp claims the district court erred by granting the State's
motion on grounds unasserted by the State and by concluding he was not
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entitled to a hearing on this claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-16.) Applying the
standards articulated above, Clapp has failed to show error.
First, the claim Clapp lacked notice of the grounds for dismissing his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel is frivolous. The State argued and the district
court concluded that the due process challenge was without merit and therefore
there was neither deficient performance nor prejudice.

(R., pp. 233-34, 284.)

The differences Clapp claims to see in the grounds for the motion and the
grounds for the order are entirely figments of imagination. The state argued, and
the district court agreed, that the due process argument would not have prevailed
on appeal and therefore there was neither deficient performance nor prejudice.
Second, dismissal on the merits was proper.

Clapp claims that, had

appellate counsel asserted that consideration of the probation officer's statement
violated due process, he would have prevailed on appeal. This argument fails for
two reasons. First, Clapp has failed to show any Sixth Amendment right to
counsel on appeal from probation violation proceedings. The due process right
to counsel is "limited to the first appeal as of right." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,
393-94 (1985); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). Clapp has cited no case
indicating he had a constitutional right to counsel to appeal from the probation
revocation proceedings. He has therefore failed to show error in the dismissal of
his claim of a Sixth Amendment violation in how his counsel handled his appeal
from revocation of his probation.
Second, even if Clapp had a right to the effective assistance of counsel he
failed to present a viable claim that right was violated.
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Appellate counsel's

performance was not deficient and Clapp was not prejudiced because the due
process violation claim is meritless.
Because no objection was asserted in the probation violation proceedings,
appellate counsel would have had to show constitutional error, that the error was
clear, and prejudice.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978

(2010) (setting forth the three-prong fundamental error standard). Review of the
record shows no error, much less fundamental error.
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause "does not apply to
probationers." State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766, 171 P.3d 253, 257 (2007).
"Likewise, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, including the rule against hearsay, do
not apply to probation revocation proceedings."

kl

(citations omitted).

The

probation officer's statement about Clapp's admission to driving was properly
considered by the district court at the revocation proceedings.

See State v.

Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 946-47, 303 P.3d 627, 633-34 (Ct. App. 2013) (not
error to consider statement by co-defendant incriminating defendant at
sentencing hearing). Had appellate counsel attempted to raise the due process
claim he would have failed to show constitutional error, much less that such error
was clear on the record.
Likewise, the district court's finding of no prejudice was correct.

Clapp

failed to demonstrate, or even articulate, why he would have been placed back
on probation but for consideration of his admission of driving. Lack of prejudice
shows he could not have prevailed on a claim of fundamental error. Because
there was no error, no clear error, and no prejudice, the due process claim would
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have failed if raised on appeal. Because the claim would have failed on appeal it
was neither deficient performance nor prejudicial for appellate counsel to not
pursue it.
On this appeal Clapp argues that the probation officer's statement that
Clapp admitted driving was rendered unreliable, and therefore beyond the scope
of consideration, because his trial attorney stated (at a different hearing) that
Clapp denied driving and that Clapp's father would assert he did not loan Clapp
the car in question. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) Clapp confuses "contested"
with "unreliable."

He cites no legal reason that merely contesting evidence

makes it unreliable, especially where, as here, hearsay evidence was contested
by contrary hearsay evidence.

Were Clapp's legal reasoning sound, a full

evidentiary hearing would be required in sentencing or probation revocation
proceedings whenever a defendant disputed any fact in any report or presentence investigation. Clapp has failed to articulate, below or on appeal, why
the probation officer's statement that Clapp had admitted driving was so
unreliable that a court could not, in its discretion, rely on that evidence.
At no point has Clapp articulated a non-frivolous challenge to the district
court's reliance on the probation officer's report at the probation violation
disposition hearing.

Because there is no basis to believe Clapp would have

prevailed on an appellate claim that such was fundamental error, he has failed to
establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal
of Clapp's petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 5th day of January,

KENNETH K. JORGE
Deputy Attorney General
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